As the number of always-on, always-connected smartphones increase, so does the amount of personal and sensitive information they collect and transmit. Thus, it is crucial to secure traffic exchanged by these devices, especially considering that mobile users might connect to open Wi-Fi networks or even fake cell towers. The go-to protocol to secure network connection is HTTPS i.e., HTTP over SSL/TLS.
In the Android ecosystem, applications (apps for short), support HTTPS on sockets by relying on the android.net, android.webkit, java.net, javax.net, java.security, javax.security.cert, and org.apache.http packages of the Android SDK. These packages are used to create HTTP/HTTPS connections, administer and verify certificates and keys, and instantiate TrustManager and HostnameVerifier interfaces, which are in turn used in the SSL certificate validation logic.
A TrustManager manages the certificates of all Certificate Authorities (CAs) used to assess a certificate’s validity. Only root CAs trusted by Android are contained in the default TrustManager. A HostnameVerifier performs hostname verification whenever a URL’s hostname does not match the hostname in the peer’s identification credentials.
While browsers provide users with visual feedback that their communication is secured (via the lock symbol) as well as certificate validation issues, non-browser apps do so less extensively and effectively. This shortcoming motivates the need to scrutinize the security of network connections used by apps to transmit user sensitive data. We found that some of the most popular Android apps insufficiently secure these connections, putting users’ passwords, credit card details and chat messages at risk.
Continue reading Experimenting with SSL Vulnerabilities in Android Apps